[英文版] 红星照耀中国:导读注释版 [美]埃德加·斯诺 著 红色经典 英语原版+导读注释 传记 上海译文出版社 正版

1936年，埃德加·斯诺带着一系列关于红色中国的疑问，不顾个人安危前往陕甘宁边区，寻求红色政权的真相。他凭着一纸介绍信，一路奔波到达当时的红色首都保安，先后采访了周恩来、毛泽东、林祖涵、刘志丹、彭德怀等人，并从红军战士的口中间接了解到朱德、贺龙等人的信息。在与红军战士同吃共住四个月后，斯诺依依不舍地离开“红区”，将自己在陕北苏区的所见所闻汇成一篇真实的新闻报道——《红星照耀中国》，即《西行漫记》。本书共有十二章，每章分为3~6个小节不等。斯诺在书中描绘了我们所熟知的中国革命大事件——国民革命、国共合作、长征等，同时凭借当时特殊的时代环境得以留下珍贵的采访记录和逸闻趣事，让我们能一感当年革命领导人在战火中的烟火气。这本承载历史使命的书籍第一次向全国，乃至全世界诠释了中国红色革命的原因和目的，介绍了中国共产党的基本政策、经济制度和生产生活等情况，生动形象地再现了毛泽东、周恩来、朱德和刘志丹等革命领导人和无数红军战士、农民、工人和知识分子在艰苦斗争岁月中的精神风貌。它打破了当时国民党和一些西方媒体对中国红色革命的歪曲与毁谤，指引了无数青年人走上了革命道路，更让全世界约略窥知红军不可征服的战斗精神和改变世界的热情与力量。

埃德加·斯诺（Edgar Snow，1905—1972），美国著名记者， 1928年以特约记者身份来华，1936年6月不顾个人安危前往陕甘宁边区，寻求红色政权的真相。在延安，斯诺与红军战士共吃穿，深入了解了苏区的生活，并将其调查与采访用真实的笔触写入《红星照耀中国》(即《西行漫记》)中。新中国成立后，斯诺先后三次访华，为增进中美两国人民的友谊作出了巨大贡献。

总序
Series Preface
Preface
PART ONE: IN SEARCH OF RED CHINA
1. Some Unanswered Questions
2. Slow Train to “Western Peace”
3. Some Han Bronzes
4. Through Red Gates
PART TWO: THE ROAD TO THE RED CAPITAL
1. Chased by White Bandits
2. The Insurrectionist
3. Something About Ho Lung
4. Red Companions
PART THREE: IN “DEFENDED PEACE”
1. Soviet Strong Man
2. Basic Communist Policies
3. On War with Japan
4. $2,000,000 in Heads
5. Red Theater
PART FOUR: GENESIS OF A COMMUNIST
1. Childhood
2. Days in Changsha
3. Prelude to Revolution
4. The Nationalist Period
5. The Soviet Movement
6. Growth of the Red Army
PART FIVE: THE LONG MARCH
1. The Fifth Campaign
2. A Nation Emigrates
3. The Heroes of Tatu
4. Across the Grasslands
PART SIX: RED STAR IN THE NORTHWEST
1. The Shensi Soviets: Beginnings
2. Death and Taxes
3. Soviet Society
4. Anatomy of Money
5. Life Begins at Fifty!
PART SEVEN: EN ROUTE TO THE FRONT
1. Conversation with Red Peasants
2. Soviet Industries
3. “They Sing Too Much”
PART EIGHT: WITH THE RED ARMY
1. The “Real” Red Army
2. Impression of P’eng Teh-huai
3. Why Is a Red?
4. Tactics of Partisan Warfare
5. Life of the Red Warrior
6. Session in Politics
PART NINE: WITH THE RED ARMY (Continued)
1. Hsu Hai-tung, the Red Potter
2. Class War in China
3. Moslem and Marxist
PART TEN: WAR AND PEACE
1. More About Horses
2. “Little Red Devils”
3. United Front in Action
4. Concerning Chu The
PART ELEVEN: BACK TO PAO AN
1. Casuals of the Road
2. Life in Pao An
3. The Russian Influence
4. Chinese Communism and the Comintern
5. That Foreign Brain Trust
6. Farewell to Red China
PART TWELVE: WHITE WORLD AGAIN
1. A Preface to Mutiny
2. The Generalissimo Is Arrested
3. Chiang, Chang and the Reds
4. “Point Counter Point”
5. Auld Lang Syne?
6. Red Horizons
Epilogue, 1944
APPENDICES
Abbreviations
Further Interviews with Mao Tse-tung

1. During my seven years in China, hundreds of questions had been asked about the Chinese Red Army, the Soviets, and the Communist movement. Eager partisans could supply you with a stock of ready answers, but these remained highly unsatisfactory. How did they know? They had never been to Red China.
The fact was that there had been perhaps no greater mystery among nations, no more confused an epic, than the story of Red China. Fighting in the very heart of the most populous nation on earth, the Celestial Reds had for nine years been isolated by a news blockade as effective as a stone fortress. A wall of thousands of enemy troops constantly surrounded them; their territory was more inaccessible than Tibet. No one had voluntarily penetrated that wall and returned to write of his experiences since the first Chinese soviet was established in southeastern Hunan, in November, 1927.
Even the simplest points were disputed. Some people denied that there was such a thing as a Red Army. There were only thousands of hungry brigands. Some denied even the existence of soviets. They were an invention of Communist propaganda. Yet Red sympathizers extolled both as the only salvation for all the ills of China. In the midst of this propaganda and counterpropaganda, credible evidence was lacking for dispassionate observers seeking the truth. Here are some of the unanswered questions that interested everyone concerned with politics and the quickening history of the Orient：
Was or was not this Red Army of China a mass of conscious Marxist revolutionaries, disciplined by and adhering to a centralized program and a unified command under the Chinese Communist Party? If so, what was that program? The Communists claimed to be fighting for agrarian revolution, and against imperialism, and for soviet democracy and national emancipation. Nanking said that the Reds were only a new type of vandals and marauders led by “intellectual bandits.” Who was right? Or was either one?
…
What was a Chinese soviet like? Did the peasants support it? If not, what held it together? To what degree did the Reds carry out “socialism” in districts where they had consolidated their power? Why hadn’t the Red Army taken big cities? Did this prove that it wasn’t a genuine proletarian-led movement, but fundamentally remained a peasant rebellion? How was it possible to speak of “communism” or “socialism” in China, where over 80 per cent of the population was still agrarian, where industrialism was still in infant garments — if not infantile paralysis?
How did the Reds dress? Eat? Play? Love? Work? What were their marriage laws? Were women “nationalized,” as Kuomintang publicists asserted? What was a Chinese “Red factory”? A Red dramatic society? How did they organize their economy? What about public health, recreation, education, “Red culture”?
What was the strength of the Red Army? Half a million, as the Comintern publications boasted? If so, why had it not seized power? Where did it get arms and munitions? Was it a disciplined army? What about its morale? Was it true that officers and men lived alike? If, as Generalissimo Chiang announced in 1935, Nanking had “destroyed the menace of Communist banditry,” what explained the fact that in 1937 the Reds occupied a bigger single unified territory (in China’s most strategic Northwest) than ever before? If the Reds were finished, why did Japan demand, as the famous Third Point of Koki Hirota (Foreign Minister, 1933-36), that Nanking form an anti-Red pact with Tokyo and Nazi Germany “to prevent the bolshevization of Asia”? Were the Reds really “anti-imperialist”? Did they want war with Japan? Would Moscow support them in such a war? Or were their fierce anti-Japanese slogans only a trick and a desperate attempt to win public sympathy, the last cry of demoralized traitors and bandits, as the eminent Dr. Hu Shih nervously assured his excited students in Peking?
What were the military and political perspectives of the Chinese Communist movement? What was the history of its development? Could it succeed? And just what would such success mean to us? To Japan? What would be the effect of this tremendous mutation upon a fifth (some said a fourth) of the world’s inhabitants? What changes would it produce in world politics? In world history? How would it affect the vast British, American, and other foreign investment in China? Indeed, had the Reds any “foreign policy” at all?
Finally, what was the meaning of the Communists’ offer to form a “national united front” in China, and stop civil war?
2. It was past two o’clock in the morning and I was exhausted, but I could see no signs of fatigue on Mao’s thoughtful face. He alternately walked up and down between the two little rooms, sat down, lay down, leaned on the table, and read from a sheaf of reports in the intervals when Wu translated and I wrote. Mrs. Mao also was still awake. Suddenly both of them bent over and gave an exclamation of delight at a moth that had languished beside the candle. It was a really lovely thing, with wings shaded a delicate apple-green and fringed in a soft rainbow of saffron and rose. Mao opened a book and pressed this gossamer of color between its leaves.
Could such people really be thinking seriously of war?
3. Comic relief was provided at this moment by the meandering goats. They were discovered nonchalantly eating the tennis net, which someone had forgotten to take down. A wave of laughter swept the audience while some cadets gave chase to the culprits and salvaged this important property of the recreation department. 4. During the nightly interviews that followed — we were like conspirators indeed, huddled in that cave over the red-covered table, with sputtering candles between us — I wrote until I was ready to fall asleep. Wu Liang-p’ing sat next to me and interpreted Mao’s soft southern dialect, in which a chicken, instead of being a good substantial northern chi, became a romantic ghii, and Hunan became Funan, and a bowl of ch’a turned into ts’a, and many much stranger variations occurred. Mao related everything from memory, and I put it down as he talked. It was, as I have said, retranslated and corrected, and this is the result, with no attempt to give it literary excellence, beyond some necessary corrections in the syntax of the patient Mr. Wu:
“I was born in the village of Shao Shan, in Hsiang T’anhsien, Hunan province, in 1893. My father’s name was Mao Jen-sheng [Mao Shun-sheng], and my mother’s maiden name was Wen Ch’i-mei.
5. Mao Tse-tung’s account had begun to pass out of the category of “personal history,” and to sublimate itself somehow intangibly in the career of a great movement in which, though he retained a dominant role, you could not see him clearly as a personality. It was no longer “I” but “we”; no longer Mao Tse-tung, but the Red Army; no longer a subjective impression of the experiences of a single life, but an objective record by a bystander concerned with the mutations of collective human destiny as the material of history.
As his story drew to a close it became more and more necessary for me to interrogate him about himself. What was he doing at that time? What office did he hold then? What was his attitude in this or that situation? And my questioning, generally, evoked such references as there are to himself in this last chapter of the narrative:
6. “The Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Committee was organized about this time, and I was elected chairman. The Red Army’s influence in Hunan was widespread, almost as much so as in Kiangsi. My name was known among the Hunanese peasants, for big rewards were offered for my capture, dead or alive, as well as for Chu Teh and other Reds. My land in Hsiang T’an was confiscated by the Kuomintang. My wife and my sister, as well as the wives of my two brothers, Mao Tse-min and Mao Tse-t’an, and my own sons were all arrested by Ho Chien [the warlord governor]. My wife (K’ai-hui) and my sister (Tse-hung) were executed. The others were later released. The prestige of the Red Army even extended to my own village, in Hsiang T’an, for I heard the tale that the local peasants believed that I would be soon returning to my native home. When one day an airplane passed overhead, they decided it was I. They warned the man who was then tilling my land that I had come back to look over my old farm, to see whether or not any trees had been cut. If so, I would surely demand compensation from Chiang Kai-shek, they said.
“But the second attack on Changsha proved to be a failure. Great reinforcements had been sent to the city and it was heavily garrisoned; besides, new troops were pouring into Hunan in September to attack the Red Army. Only one important battle occurred during the siege, and in it the Red Army eliminated two brigades of enemy troops. It could not, however, take the city of Changsha, and after a few weeks withdrew to Kiangsi.
“This failure helped to destroy the Li Li-san line and saved the Red Army from what would probably have been a catastrophic attack on Wuhan, which Li was demanding. The main tasks of the Red Army then were the recruiting of new troops, the sovietization of new rural areas, and, above all, the consolidation under thorough soviet power of such areas as already had fallen to the Red Army. For such a program the attacks on Changsha were not necessary and had an element of adventure in them. Had the first occupation been undertaken as a temporary action, however, and not with the idea of attempting to hold the city and set up a state power there, its effects might have been considered beneficial, for the reaction produced on the national revolutionary movement was very great. The error was a strategic and tactical one, in attempting to make a base of Changsha while the soviet power was still not consolidated behind it.”
7. In the middle of October, 1936, after I had been with the Reds nearly four months, arrangements were finally completed for my return to the White world. It had not been easy. Chang Hsueh-liang’s friendly Tungpei troops had been withdrawn from nearly every front and replaced by Nanking or other hostile forces. There was only one outlet then, through a Tungpei division which still had a front with the Reds near Lochuan, a walled city a day’s motor trip north of Sian.
I walked down the main street of Defended Peace for the last time, and the farther I got toward the gate, the more reluctantly I moved. People popped their heads out of offices to shout last remarks. My poker club turned out en masse to bid the maestro good-by, and some “little devils” trudged with me to the walls of Pao An. I stopped to take a picture of Old Hsu and Old Hsieh, their arms thrown around each other’s shoulders. Only Mao Tse-tung failed to appear; he was still asleep.
“Don’t forget my artificial arm!” called Ts’ai.
“Don’t forget my films!”urged Lu Ting-yi.3
“We’ll be waiting for the air fleet!” laughed Yang Shang-k’un.
“Send me in a wife!” demanded Li K’e-nung.
“And send back those four ounces of cocoa,” chided Po Ku.
The whole Red University was seated out in the open, under a great tree, listening to a lecture by Lo Fu, when I went past. They all came over, and we shook hands, and I mumbled a few words. Then I turned and forded the stream, waved them a farewell, and rode up quickly with my little caravan. I might be the last foreigner to see any of them alive, I thought. It was very depressing. I felt that I was not going home, but leaving it.