亚里士多德哲学 [正版]存在与时间 英文原版 Being and Time 马丁海德格尔 Martin Heidegge

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书名：Being and Time存在与时间
作者：Martin Heidegger马丁•海德格尔
出版社名称：Harper Perennial
出版时间：2008
语种：英文
ISBN：9780061575594
商品尺寸：14.3 x 3.1 x 21.3 cm
包装：平装
页数：590
Being and Time《存在与时间》是海德格尔的成名作，是二十世纪具有影响力的哲学作品，且其影响力不局限于哲学领域，还扩展到文学、政治学、社会学、艺术等领域。

“What is the meaning of being?” This is the central question of Martin Heidegger’s profoundly important work, in which the great philosopher seeks to explain the basic problems of existence. A central influence on later philosophy, literature, art, and criticism—as well as existentialism and much of postmodern thought—Being and Timeforever changed the intellectual map of the modern world. As Richard Rorty wrote in the New York Times Book Review, “You cannot read most of the important thinkers of recent times without taking Heidegger’s thought into account.”
This first paperback edition of John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson’s definitive translation also features a new foreword by Heidegger scholar Taylor Carman.

Review
“Powerful and original... Being and Time changed the course of philosophy.” —Richard Rorty, New York Times Book Review
Being and Time《存在与时间》是德国哲学家海德格尔的代表著作，也是本世纪重要的哲学著作之一，不仅影响了此后多种重要哲学流派和重要哲学家，而且在文学批评、社会学、神学、心理学、政治学、法学等多种领域产生了广泛而深刻的影响。《存在与时间》一书批判了自柏拉图、亚里士多德以来把哲学当成知识，把存在当作存在者来研究的传统。同时抛弃了近代以笛卡尔为代表的哲学研究中以认识为起点的方法。海德格尔哲学是从人的存在——此在入手，在对“存在”的追问中达到存在的意义的澄明。海德格尔的《存在与时间》所奠基的存在哲学无论在研究宗旨上还是在内容上都意味着西方哲学的一次重大转变。
马丁•海德格尔（Martin Heidegger 1889-1976），德国著名哲学家，20世纪存在主义哲学的创始人和主要代表之一。除了《存在与时间》，他的主要著作还有：《什么是形而上学》（1929年）、《现象学基本问题》（1923年演讲稿）、《真理的本质》（1943年）、《林中路》（1953年）、《演讲与论文集》（1954年）、《走向语言之途》（1959年）、《技术与转向》（1962年）等。

Martin Heidegger(1889-1976) was born in Baden-Württemberg, Germany. He studied at the University of Freiburg and became a professor at the University of Marburg in 1932. After publishing his magnum opus, Being and Time, he returned to Freiburg to assume the chair of philosophy upon Husserl’s retirement.
“Science in general may be defined as the totality established through an interconnection of true propositions.” This definition is not complete, nor does it reach the meaning of science. As ways in which man behaves, sciences have the manner of Being which this entity—man himself— possesses. This entity we denote by the term “Dasein”. Scientific research is not the only manner of Being which this entity can have, nor is it the one which lies closest. Moreover, Dasein itself has a special distinctiveness as compared with other entities, and it is worth our while to bring this to view in a provisional way. Here our discussion must anticipate later analyses, in which our results will be authentically exhibited for the first time.
Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. But in that case, this is a constitutive state of Dasein’s Being, and this implies that Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards that Being—a relationship which itself is one of Being.2 And this means further that there is some way in which Dasein understands itself in its Being, and that to some degree it does so explicitly. It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it. Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein’s Being. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological.
Here “Being-ontological” is not yet tantamount to “developing an ontology”. So if we should reserve the term “ontology” for that theoretical inquiry which is explicitly devoted to the meaning of entities, then what we have had in mind in speaking of Dasein’s “Being-ontological” is to be designated as something “pre-ontological”. It does not signify simply “being-ontical”, however, but rather “being in such a way that one has an understanding of Being”.
That kind of Being towards which Dasein can comport itself in one way or another, and always does comport itself somehow, we call “exisknce” [Exiskn]. And because we cannot define Dasein’s essence by citing a “what” of the kind that pertains to a subject-matter [eines sachhaltigen Was], and because its essence lies rather in the fact that in each case it has its Being to be, and has it as its own, we have chosen to designate this entity as “Dasein”, a term which is purely an expression of its Being [als reiner Seinsausdruck].