由于此商品库存有限,请在下单后15分钟之内支付完成,手慢无哦!
100%刮中券,最高50元无敌券,券有效期7天
活动自2017年6月2日上线,敬请关注云钻刮券活动规则更新。
如活动受政府机关指令需要停止举办的,或活动遭受严重网络攻击需暂停举办的,或者系统故障导致的其它意外问题,苏宁无需为此承担赔偿或者进行补偿。
全新正版论需求信息传递的价值9787564194796东南大学出版社
¥ ×1
Chapter I Introduction
Chapter II Incentive-driven Information Dissemination in Two-tier Supply Chains
2.1 Introduction
2.2 The model
. Information flow in supply chains
..1 Bilateral monopoly (Setting B)
..2 Upstream supplier competition (System SC)
.. Downstream retailer competition (System RC)
..4 Chain-to-chain competition (System SRC)
2.4 Comparative analysis and managerial insights
2.5 Concluding remarks
Chapter III On Strategic Demand Information Dissemination
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Model preliminaries
3.3 Information structure
3.3.1 Analytical procedure
3.3.2 Signal acquisition by the supplier
3.3.3 Equilibrium characterization
3.4 Concluding remarks
Chapter IV Strategic Demand Information Dissemination under Unintentional Information Leakage
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Information structure
4.2.1 Analysis
4.2.2 Signal acquisition by the supplier
4.. Strategic interplay
4.2.4 Information structure
4.3 Concluding remarks
Chapter V Summary and Future Research
References
Appendix A Proofs for Chapter II
Appendix B Proofs for Chapter III
Appendix C Proofs for Chapter IV
List of Figures
List of Tables
郝忠原,女,东北财经大学现代供应链管理研究院常任轨教师,香港理工大学哲学博士。主要研究方向为供应链管理、运营管理及信息管理等。研究成果已发表在Manufacturing & Service Oraios Management,Production and Oraios Management等管理学顶期刊上。
本书运用经济学、概率论、优化理论、博弈理论等方和技构建供应链系统横纵向需求信息共享的数学模型,通过研究系统结构、信息结构、市场竞争等因素对横向及纵向需求信息共享的驱动作用、横向与纵向需求信息共享的内在联系以及需求信息共享对供应链企业和供应链系统的价值等,探究供应链系统中横纵向需求信息共享的内在驱动机制,为我国企业更加合理地的制定信息共享策略提供决策依据,促进供应链企业之间建立紧密的协作关系,降低需求不确定因素对各企业的决策和供应链系统运行状态的影响。We investigate information flow in two-tier supply chains, where retailers order from suppliers and sell in a market with uncertain demand. The retailers each have access to a demand signal and can exchange signals (horizontal information sharing). The suppliers can offer the retailers differential payments to gain access to their signals . We demonstrate that retailer competition is a necessary condition to sustain information flow, whereas supplier competition precludes vertical information acquisition. Facing horizontal competition, the retailers can have an incentive to exchange signals if competition is less intense; and this incentive is stronger when they order from independent suppliers than when they order from a monopolist supplier.
亲,大宗购物请点击企业用户渠道>小苏的服务会更贴心!
亲,很抱歉,您购买的宝贝销售异常火爆让小苏措手不及,请稍后再试~
非常抱歉,您前期未参加预订活动,
无法支付尾款哦!
抱歉,您暂无任性付资格