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Series Foreword xi
Acknowledgments xiii
1 Introduction
1.I Introduction
1.2 Large Populations and Matching Models
1.3 Three Common Models of Learning and／or Evolution
1.4 Cournot Adjustment
1.5 Analysis of Cournot Dynamics
1.6 Cournorces with Lock.In
1.7 Review of Finite Simultaneous—Move Games
Appendix：Dynamical Systems and Local Stability
References
2 Fictitious Play
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Two—Player Fictitious Play
. Asymptotic Behavior of Fictitious Play
2.4 Interpretation of Cycles in Fictitious Play
2.5 Multiplayer Fictitious Play
2.6 Payoffs in Fictitious Play
2.7 Consistency and Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Two Strategies
2.8 Fictitious Play and the Best-Response Dynamic
2.9 Generalizations of Fictitious Play
Appendix：Dirichlerir an Mtnomial Sampling
References
3 Replicator Dynamics and Related Deterministic Models of Evolution
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Replicator Dynamics in a Homogeneous Population
3.3 Stability in the Homogeneous—Population Replicator Dynamic
3.4 Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
3.5 Asymmetric Replicator Models
3.6 Interpretation of the Replicator Equation
3.7 Generalizations of the Replicator Dynamic and Iterated Strict Dominance
3.8 Myopic Adjustment Dynamics
3.9 Set-Valued Limit Points and Drift
3.10 Cheap Talk and the Secret Handshake
3.11 Discrete.Time Replicator Systems
Appendix：Liouville’S Theorem
References
4 Stochastic Fictitious Play and Mixed—Strategy Equilibria
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Notions of Convergence
4.3 Asymptotic Myopia and Asymptotic Empiricism
4.4 Randomly Perturbed Payoffs and Smoothed Best Responses
4.5 Smooth Fictitious Play and Stochastic Approximation
4.6 PartiaI Sampling
4.7 Universal Consistency and Smooth Fictitious Play
4.8 Stimulus—Response and Fictitious Play as Learning Models
4.9 Learning about Strategy Spaces
Appendix：Stochastic Approximation Theory
References
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